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Abstract 
 
Background 
 
Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners income has been determined by the quality of their care. 
The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the 
form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper 
threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the 
denominator is the number of patients the practices declare are suitable for the indicator.  The 
number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number 
exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to 
avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were 
not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who 
should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of 
exception reporting or gaming. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper 
threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing 
reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting 
delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for 
gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.  
 
Data 
 
We used routinely available data on the Quality and Outcomes Framework from Scottish practices 
(n=916) for 2004/05 and 2005/06. We also include data on practice characteristics and on socio-
demographic and morbidity factors from the 2001 census and the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation.  
 
Methods 
 
Multiple regressions of delivered quality, exception reporting, and prevalence reports on practice and 
patient characteristics. We test for gaming of exception reporting by comparing the rates of exception 
reporting in 2005/6 for practices which were above the upper threshold in 2004/5 (which would have 
had no incentive to increase exception reporting) with practices which were below the threshold in 
2004/5 (which would have had a financial incentive to increase exception reporting rates. We also 
compared prevalence reporting in 2005/6 for practices above the upper threshold in year one (who 
would gain financially by increasing prevalence) with those below the threshold in year one (who 
might not).  
 
Results 
 
90.8% of practices reported levels of achievement above the upper thresholds. They could have 
reduced the number of patients treated by 11.8% without reducing income, indicating a degree of 
altruistic behaviour.  Delivered quality was lower in practices with more income deprived patients and 
with a higher proportion of ethnic minority patients, though the effects of these variables were quite 
small. 
 
Practices which were above the upper threshold for an indicator in 2004/05 had higher prevalence in 
2005/6 compared to practices that were below the threshold in 2004/05.  
 
For exception reporting, practices which were below the upper threshold for an indicator in 2004/05 
had higher exception reporting rates in 2005/6 than practices which were below the upper threshold. 
From the differences between the two types of practice, we estimate that, in practices which were 
below indicator thresholds in 2004/05, 0.87% of patients might have been inappropriately exception 
reported in 2005/06, or 10.9% of the overall number of patients exception reported.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The results suggest that general practitioners are partially altruistic in that the majority produced 
markedly higher quality than was required to maximise their financial rewards. Quality delivered to 
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patients was higher in larger practices and in practices with less deprived populations and with a 
smaller ethnic minority population. 
 
Exception reporting removes incentives towards inappropriate or over-treatment of patients. But the 
QOF provides perverse incentives for gaming of exceptions and we find evidence that practices which 
performed worse in 2004/5 were more likely to game exceptions in 2005/6.  
 
The incentives in QOF also affect case finding and reporting by practices and we find evidence that 
practices which performed worse in 2004/5 had lower reported prevalence in 2005/6.  We also find 
that reported prevalence rates are associated with practice characteristics, such as whether the 
practice was a fundholder, suggesting that the QOF prevalence reports may not be a reliable 
epidemiological resource.  
 
Keywords.  Quality.  Incentives.  Gaming.  Pay for performance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The development of new methods of measuring the quality of health care has led to the recognition 
that there are wide variations in the quality of health care providers (Fisher, 2006; Institute of 
Medicine, 2007).  It has also prompted an international interest in the use of pay for performance 
schemes to improve quality.  Schemes are being developed in Australia (Scott, 2007; Medicare 
Australia, 2007), Canada (Pink et al, 2006), Germany (Greb et al, 2006), The Netherlands (Custers T 
et al, 2006) New Zealand (Perkins and Seddon, 2006), Spain (Gené-Badia et al, 2007), the US 
(Rosenthal, 2005, 2006; Epstein, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2006), and the UK (Roland, 2004).  
 
The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) introduced in 2004 in the UK National Health Service 
(NHS) is possibly the most elaborate and expensive health care pay for performance scheme. All 
10,000 general (primary care) practices in the UK were required to report their achievements on 146 
quality indicators. The average practice, containing four general practitioners (GPs), stood to gain 
around £130,000 per year in 2005/6 if it achieved all indicators to the maximum extent. The amount 
paid out to practices under the QOF was around £1,000M in 2005/6.
1
 
 
The QOF was a good deal for GPs.  It increased their income by about 25% (£20,000 per year), 
reduced their hours of work, and increased their job satisfaction (Whalley, Gravelle and Sibbald, 
2007).  The effect on patients is less clear.  The tentative conclusion, from studies based on subsets 
of the indicators (Hippisely-Cox, Vinogradova, and Coupland, 2007; Gulliford et al, 2007; Campbell et 
al, 2007; Steel et al, 2007; Tahrani et al, 2007), is that the quality of care had been increasing since 
the late 1990s, but that the QOF may have led to above trend increases in some of the activities it 
incentivises.   
 
One of the difficulties in designing P4P schemes linking financial rewards to measures of performance 
is that the incentives may generate unanticipated and dysfunctional behaviour (Prendergarst, 1999). 
In this paper, we use some of the features of the QOF, in particular a sharp discontinuity in the link 
between reward and performance, to test for gaming. We show that a scheme based on ratio quality 
measures, intended to incentivise doctors to increase the numerator also contained incentives to 
manipulate the denominators, and that some doctors did so.
2
 
 
Around half of potential QOF revenue is attached to indicators of clinical quality measured as the ratio 
of treated patients to the number of patients reported to be eligible for the indicator. For example, 
indicator CHD6 is the proportion of eligible patients with coronary heart disease whose blood pressure 
is controlled.  QOF revenue increase linearly with the proportion treated, between a lower threshold 
(0.25) and an upper threshold (0.70) (see Figure 1 and Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  Example of indicators from Coronary Heart Disease domain 
Indicator Max points Upper 
threshold 
 
CHD1: Practice has register of patients with CHD (yes/no) 
 
6 
 
CHD5: Percentage of CHD patients whose notes record BP in previous 15 
months 
7 90% 
CHD6: Percentage of CHD patients whose BP in previous 15 months is 
150/90 or less 
19 70% 
CHD11: Percentage of patients with a history of myocardial infarction 
(diagnosed after 1 April 2003) who are currently treated with an ACE inhibitor 
7 70% 
All lower thresholds in all disease domains are 25% 
                                                 
1
 2005/6 is the financial year 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2006.  Similarly for the financial year 2004/5. 
2
 We briefly report on the factors affecting practice points achievement and quality in Appendix D.  
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Figure 1. Achievement and points for a continuous quality indicator (CHD6) 
 
Expressing a clinical indicator as a ratio is intended to provide an incentive to practices to increase 
the numerator, i.e. to increase the number of treated patients.  But practices can also reduce the 
denominator, i.e. the number they declare as eligible for treatment. The number declared eligible is 
the number of patients the practice reports as having a condition (prevalence) minus the number it 
exception reports for the indicator. Patients can be reported as unsuitable for an indicator on a variety 
of grounds (Appendix A), for example because they are terminally ill or have failed to attend for 
treatment. Thus practices can increase QOF revenue by gaming their reports of both prevalence and 
exceptions. 
 
We test for gaming of prevalence and exception reporting in two ways.  First, true disease prevalence 
and exception reporting rates are determined by the characteristics of the population served by the 
practice. They should not vary with characteristics of the practice, such as the type of contract it holds 
or the number of neighbouring practices.  We find that prevalence and exception reporting rates vary 
with population characteristics, such as ethnicity and deprivation, in expected ways. But reporting was 
also significantly affected by characteristics of the practice. For example, exception reporting rates 
were higher in practices where patients had fewer practices to choose from. This test for gaming is 
vulnerable to the omission of population characteristics that affect true prevalence or exceptions and 
are correlated with the included practice characteristics. We attempt to reduce such omitted variable 
bias by including measures of practice population morbidity, deprivation, rurality, and ethnicity. 
 
Our second test uses the structure of the incentive scheme. The marginal reward for overstating 
exceptions is positive when the quality ratio is below the upper threshold and zero when it is above 
the upper threshold. Similarly, practice revenue is increased by understating prevalence when the 
quality ratio is below the upper threshold. Moreover, because of another feature of the scheme 
explained below, practice revenue is increased by overstating prevalence when the quality ratio is 
above the upper threshold.  
 
The price per point increased by 75% between the first and second years of the QOF.  Thus, for 
practices below the upper threshold for an indicator there was a considerable increase in the marginal 
financial reward for increasing the proportion of eligible patients treated. For practices above the 
threshold the marginal financial reward from increasing the quality ratio treated was zero in both 
years. We argue that practices which were below the upper threshold in the first year of the scheme 
would have higher reported exception rates and lower reported prevalence in the second year than 
practices above the upper threshold. Practices above the upper threshold in 2004/5 would only have 
to maintain their behaviour to maximise their 2005/6 revenue from the QOF.  We find that practices 
that were below the upper threshold in the first year had higher exception rates and lower prevalence 
1 DU  = 0.70 DL = 0.25 Achievement D = N/(P – E) 
So 
Points 
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rates in the second year than practices that were above the threshold in the first year.  Practices 
below the upper threshold in 2004/5 had an average exception rate of 8.55% in 2005/6 and we 
estimate that without the incentive to increase their exceptions they would have had an exception rate 
of 7.25 %.  Practices which were above the upper threshold in 2004/5 had reported standardised 
prevalence in 2005/6 which was 3.5% greater, against a mean of 100,  than if they had been below 
the upper threshold in 2004/5.  
 
Section 2 describes the incentives for family doctors in the QOF. Section 3 specifies a simple model 
of the behaviour of semi-altruistic family doctors under the QOF. It shows how the discontinuity in the 
link between payment and quality provides a means of testing for gaming. The data are described in 
Section 4 and results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the implications of the results 
for the design of pay for performance schemes. 
 
 
2. Incentives in the QOF 
 
2.1  Family doctor contracts  
 
The NHS is financed almost entirely from general taxation.  Patients register with general practices, 
which act as gatekeepers for elective hospital care.  Patients face almost no charges for NHS health 
care.
3
 
 
GPs are independent contractors, apart from a small minority
 
(0.8% in Scotland) who are directly 
employed by their local primary care organisation, They are organised in partnerships with a mean 
size of 4.4 GPs and around 5,200 patients. 
 
GPs are paid under one of two contracts.  Most GPs (90% in Scotland) are in practices with a 
nationally negotiated General Medical Services (GMS) contract under which they are paid by a 
mixture of capitation, lump sum allowances, items of service, and target incentives including the QOF.  
The capitation payments vary with the age of patients and with the deprivation level of the area in 
which they lived. GPs have to meet all their practice expenses from their gross income, except for 
some specific reimbursements for the costs of practice nurses and computing systems.  Additionally, 
where there is no local pharmacy, GPs are permitted to dispense the medicines they prescribe.  
Dispensing practices can make a profit from dispensing since they receive a dispensing fee per item 
and are reimbursed for the drugs they buy at a rate that often exceeds the price they paid.  
 
Around a tenth of Scottish practices have opted to be paid under a Primary Medical Services (PMS) 
contract. These contracts are negotiated between the practice and their local primary care 
organisation (Health Board in Scotland). Under the PMS contract, the practice receives a lump sum in 
exchange for agreeing to provide the services they would have provided under the GMS contract, 
plus additional services for particular patient groups.  The amount received is typically the amount the 
practice would have received under GMS, plus an addition intended to cover the cost of the extra 
services. As under GMS, the practice has to meet its expenses from its gross income.  PMS practices 
were required to take part in the QOF, but, because it was thought that they would already be being 
paid for some of the services counting towards the QOF, they had points deducted from their QOF 
score.
4
 
 
2.2  Quality indicators and practice revenue 
 
The QOF rewards practices according to quality indicators for four areas: clinical (covering eleven 
chronic diseases), organisation (for example whether the practice has an annual review of patient 
complaints and suggestions), patient experience (for example whether the practice has undertaken an 
approved patient survey in the past year), and additional services (the practice offers ante natal care 
and screening).  (See Tables 2,3) There are additional points for holistic care (determined by the 
                                                 
3
 The only charge is for drugs prescribed in primary care. Because of the wide range of exemptions on grounds of age, income, 
and health, 92% of drug prescriptions carried no charge in 2005/6. 
http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/info3.jsp;jsessionid=A436EB8C9E9ED916E8D06A4DDB99020C?pContentID=2237&p_applic=C
CC&p_service=Content.show& 
4
 The deduction was168 points in 2004/5 and 109 points in 2005/6, from a maximum possible score of 1050 points  
(www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/pmsagreements0904~pmsnewgms?OpenDocuments&Highlight=2,PMS,QOF) 
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percentage of the available points scored on the third worst disease domain in the clinical quality 
area), for quality practice (determined by the third worst performance in the domains of the three non-
clinical areas), and a bonus based on an access survey.
5
 
 
Table 2. QOF areas: indicators and points 
 
Indicators Maximum points 
Clinical quality 76 550 
Organisation 56 184 
Patient experience  4 100 
Additional services 10  36 
   
Holistic care  100 
Quality practice   30 
Access bonus   50 
 
  
Total 146 1050 
 
We concentrate on the 65 ratio clinical indicators that are measured as the proportion of relevant 
patients for whom an indicator has been achieved. For example, indicator CHD5 is the proportion of 
patients with Coronary Heart Disease whose notes have a record of blood pressure in the last 15 
months. The indicators are listed in Table 3. The indicators carry points that have a monetary value 
which varies with the size of the practice and with the proportion of the practice population in each 
disease domain.  
 
Achievement by a practice on a ratio clinical quality indicator is D = N /D = N/(P  E).  N is the number 
of patients for whom the indicator is achieved eg the number with CHD whose blood pressure has 
been measured in the last 15 months.  D = P  E is the number of patients declared as suitable for the 
indicator. Prevalence P is the number of patients in the disease domain reported by the practice. E is 
the number of patients who are exception reported by the practice because the indicator is not 
appropriate for them.  Patients may be exception reported on nine grounds (Appendix A). For 
example, terminal cancer patients with hypertension would be excluded from the hypertension 
indicators. Patients who have been invited to attend for treatment on three occasions in the preceding 
twelve months and have failed to attend can also be excluded.  
 
The number of points (and hence revenue) earned on an indicator varies linearly with achievement for 
( , )L UD D D . See Figure 1.  No points are earned if D is less than or equal to the lower threshold D, 
which is 25% for all indicators.  At the upper threshold D  the practice receives the maximum number 
of points So available for the indicator and further increases in achievement have no effect on 
revenue.  The upper thresholds vary across indicators, from 50% to 90%, and the maximum points 
vary from 2 to 56 (Table 3).
6
    
 
Formally, the number of points earned for an indicator is 
( ) min{1,max{( ) /( ),0}}o L U LS S D S D D D D               (1) 
The revenue from the indicator is the number of points times the price per point. The price per point is 
the product of the national average price per point v, the list size of the practice relative to the national 
average list size M/ M , and the adjusted practice disease prevalence factor F for the disease domain 
containing the indicator: 
( ) ( )MR v F P
M
S D        (2) 
 
The national average price per point v was £70 in 2004/5 and £124.60 in 2005/6. 
                                                 
5
 The large number of indicators and the holistic payment are an attempt to reduce effort diversion problems (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991) arising when agents perform several socially valuable tasks. 
6
 Setting upper thresholds below 100% was intended to reduce the risk that GPs would be inappropriately treat some patients, 
for example those with co-morbidities. Exception reporting was justified on the same grounds. The rationale is peculiar for 
those indicators where there is no risk to patients, for example the recording of blood pressure, as opposed to providing 
treatment for hypertension.  Upper thresholds below 100% make it easier to earn points and increase the marginal reward for 
treating a patient. 
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Table 3.  Disease domains: ratio clinical quality indicators, achievement, and reported prevalence. Scottish practices 
2004/5, 2005/6. 
Disease domain Number of indicators Points available Upper threshold achievement 
2004/05 
Upper threshold 
achievement 2005/06 
Reported raw prevalence rate (%) 
2005/06 
   
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Asthma 6 65 0.75 0.26 0.94 0.15 5.44 1.09 
Cancer 1 6 0.76 0.39 0.87 0.31 0.72 0.23 
CHD 11 95 0.81 0.22 0.95 0.10 4.58 1.05 
COPD 7 40 0.70 0.30 0.89 0.19 1.86 0.92 
Diabetes 17 93 0.81 0.19 0.91 0.12 3.40 0.72 
Epilepsy 3 14 0.65 0.30 0.84 0.24 0.71 0.21 
Hypertension 4 96 0.72 0.35 0.92 0.20 12.07 2.78 
Hypothyroidism 1 6 0.93 0.21 0.98 0.13 2.96 0.92 
LVD 2 16 0.76 0.38 0.88 0.31 0.65 0.26 
Mental health 4 34 0.76 0.38 0.88 0.31 0.60 0.33 
Stroke and TIA 9 27 0.78 0.24 0.95 0.12 1.92 0.54 
Total 65 492       
Prevalence rate: List weighted mean of raw prevalence rates.  
Upper threshold achievement is the unweighted average across practices of Domain upper.   Domain upper is the average proportion of indicators in a domain for which the practice achieved the 
upper threshold, weighted by maximum possible points for the indicator. 
CHD: coronary heart disease.  COPD: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  LVD: left ventricular dysfunction.  TIA: transient ischaemic attacks.
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The adjusted disease prevalence factor F is the square root of the practice disease prevalence rate 
divided by the unweighted average of the square roots of the practice prevalence rates in all 
practices:
7
 
     11 22 11( ) / /G h hhF F P P M G P M

ª º  « »¬ ¼¦ ,      ( ) 0F Pc !         (3) 
Where G is the total number of practices. Thus practice revenue from an indicator is8  
 
> @1 12 2 11/ ( ) / ( / )h h hR v M M P M G P MS D ª ºª º ¦¬ ¼ ¬ ¼      (4) 
 
A practice of given list size can alter its QOF revenue by changing  
x the number of patients for whom the indicator is met (N) 
x the number of patients who are exception reported for that indicator (E) 
x the reported number of patients with the relevant condition (P) 
When ( , )L UD D D  increasing the number of patients for whom the indicator is met (N) or increasing 
exception reporting (E) will increase revenue.   
 
The effect of reporting a larger number of prevalent patients (P) is more complicated. An increase in P 
reduces achievement D = N/(P  E) and increases the adjusted disease prevalence factor F(P).  If D < 
DL then ( ) 0S Dc   and S(D) = 0, so that / 0R Pw w  .  When D > DU we have ( )S Dc = 0 and S(D) > 0, 
so that /R Pw w > 0 because of the increase in the adjusted disease prevalence factor.  In the 
intermediate range ( , )L UD D D  increases in P reduce achievement D but increase the adjusted 
disease prevalence factor.  We can show (Appendix B) that the overall effect is to reduce revenue 
from the indicator.  Thus  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R v F P v F P
P P
DS D S Dw wc c w w   
                  = 0,     D  < DL 
      0,       ( , )L UD D D  
      0,!             D  > DU             (5) 
 
with marginal revenue jumping down from zero at DL and jumping from negative to positive at DU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 We ignore an additional complication that the practice prevalence rate should have been truncated at the 5
th
 centile both in 
calculating the practice rate and the national average rate. It appears that in Scotland the truncation was applied only to the 
very few practices with prevalence less than 5% of the national mean. The effect of the square root transformation is to reduce 
the difference in rewards arising from differences in prevalence rates. Guthrie, McLean and Sutton (2006) investigate its effect 
on practice revenue.  
8
 Because prevalence rates vary across disease domains and practices and the upper threshold varies across indicators the full 
formula for revenue for indicator i in disease domain k for practice g is   
  
1 12 2
1
1/ ( ) / ( / )hgki g ki gki gk g hk hR v M M P M G P MS D
ª ºª º ª º ¦¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼   
where Sgki =Ski(Dgki) min{1,max{( ) /( ),0}}oki gki kiL kiU kiLS D D D D    and Dgki = Ngki/(Pgk  Egki).  A change in reported 
prevalence Pgk affects all the indicators in disease domain k, so the effect on practice revenue is /gki gki R Pw w¦ which 
depends on the mix of indicators in the domain for which the proportion of patients for whom the indicator is achieved is above 
or below the upper threshold. 
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3 Practice behaviour under the QOF 
 
3.1  Optimal treating and cheating 
 
We now specify a model of practice behaviour under the QOF. We assume that GPs are quasi-
altruistic: they care about their income and about patient welfare (McGuire, 2000).  Practice utility is 
linear in patient health and practice income (QOF revenue minus costs) and there is only one quality 
indicator:   
 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )s N E P bN R N E P C N E P    
    ( ) ( )bN v F PS D     1 1 1/ /o o oN E Pc N c E E P c P P M      
               221 2 22 ( ) /o oN Ec N c E E Pª  «¬  22 ( ) /oPc P P M º  »¼      (6) 
where D = N/(P  E) is practice achievement and /v vM M .  Patient health is proportional to the 
number treated and the parameter b t 0 reflects both technology (the effect of treatment on patient 
health) and the strength of GP altruism.  
 
Eo/Po is the exception rate if the practice used the exception criteria properly and did not game.  E/P – 
Eo/Po is the rate of exception gaming.  Similarly Po/M is the true prevalence rate and P/M – Po/M is the 
rate of gaming of prevalence reporting. If there was no financial or psychic cost to gaming then all 
practices would achieve at least the upper thresholds and score maximum points.  The inclusion of 
E/P – Eo/Po and P/M – Po/M in the cost function is a means of capturing the idea that gaming has a 
cost which may be a psychic cost of offending against professional ethics or the certainty equivalent 
of a financial penalty if caught cheating.  The cost parameters (cN, cE2, cP2 are all positive and cE1, cP1 
are non-negative. The cost function derivatives with respect to E and P jump from negative to positive 
at Eo and Po. 
 
The derivatives of s with respect to numbers treated, exceptions, and prevalence are9  
 
1 2
1( ) ( ) N N
s b v F P c c N
N P E
S Dw c   w           (7) 
 
1 22 2
1 ( )( ) ( )( )
o o
E Eo o
d E Es N E E
v F P c c
E P E dE P P
S D w c  w        (8) 
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
s N
v F P v F P
P P E
S D S Dw c c  w   
1 2 2
1 ( )o o
P P
d P P P P
c c
dP M M
       (9) 
 
The seven possible solutions to the problem of maximising Error! Reference source not found. 
subject to non-negativity constraints on N, E, and P and to D = N/(P  E)  [0,1] are illustrated in 
Figure 2.
10
 
(i)  D = 0.  With sufficiently low altruism and high marginal costs of treatment and gaming the practice 
provides no treatment and does not game: N = 0, E = Eo, P = Po. 
(ii)  (0, )LD D .  The practices altruism is sufficiently great and marginal cost of treatment 
sufficiently small to lead it to treat some patients but not enough to achieve the lower threshold.  
                                                 
9
 Except at the lower threshold where ( )S Dc jumps from zero to become positive and at the upper threshold were it jumps 
down to zero and at E = Eo (and P = Po) where there are upward jumps in the cost function with respect to E (and P). 
10
 Preferences in R, N space are given by S(R,N; E,P) = R + bN  C(N,E,P) with the revenue function R = R(N;E,P) given by 
Error! Reference source not found.. The marginal utility of treatment is SN = b – cNN. 
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Because it has not achieved the lower threshold there is no income gain from gaming exceptions or 
prevalence. Hence P = Po, E = Eo and LD (Po – Eo) > N > 0. 
(iii) D = LD . This cannot be a solution.  If D = LD  is the solution it must be true that /s Nw w  is non-
negative for D < LD and non-positive for D > LD . But the derivative of u with respect to N jumps 
upward at D = LD .  
(iv) ( , )L UD D D . The practice fails to achieve the upper threshold but it may game by overstating 
exceptions E > Eo and understating prevalence P < Po if cE1 and cP1 are small enough. 
(v)  D = DU.  The practice just achieves the upper threshold. It may do so by overstating exceptions 
and understating prevalence if cE1 and cP1 are small enough. 
(vi)  ( ,1)UD D . The practice has high enough altruism and low enough marginal cost of treatment 
that it is willing to treat patients even though the marginal treated patient reduces practice income.  
Since the marginal revenue from increased achievement is zero it does not game exceptions (E = Eo) 
even if cE1 = 0 since this will merely increase its costs. Revenue is increased by higher reported 
prevalence and the practice will overstate prevalence P > Po if cP1 is sufficiently small.  
(vii) D = 1.  If N/(Po  Eo) = 1 marginal revenue from reported prevalence is positive.  But if cP1 is 
sufficiently large there is no incentive to overstate prevalence even at P = Po. Thus the solution has E 
= Eo,  P t Po and N = P – Eo.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Solution types 
 
The solution types are summarised in Figure 3. The optimal values of N, E, and P depend on the 
practices altruism parameter b, cost parameters, true prevalence Po, true exceptions Eo, and list size 
M.   The utility function s(N,E,P) is not concave and has discontinuous derivatives at the upper and 
lower thresholds. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive some comparative static predictions (see 
Appendix C for details).  We can establish 
 
Proposition 1. For any given vector of cost parameters, true prevalence, true exceptions and list size, 
there exist b1, b2, b3, b4 (with b1 < b2 < b3 < b4) such that for all b < b1 the practice optimum has D < DL 
, for 2 3( , )b b b  the optimum has ( , )L UD D D  and for b > b4  the optimum has D  > DU.   
  
It can also be shown that, holding all other parameters constant, changes in the cost function 
parameters which reduce the marginal cost of treatment will also shift the optimum in the same way 
as the increase as the altruism parameter.  We use the proposition to derive tests for gaming of 
prevalence and exceptions. 
R(N;E,P) 
(vii) (vi) 
(v) 
(iv) 
(iii) (ii
(i) 
P – E 0 
R 
Du(P - E) ( )L P ED   N 
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Figure 3.  Solution types and achievement level 
 
3.2  Testing for gaming 
 
Prevalence reporting below and above the upper threshold   
 
Very few practices had D < DL for any indicator. We therefore test for gaming by comparing practices 
with ( , )L UD D D  and D  > DU.  The marginal revenue from an increase in declared prevalence (P) is 
negative for practices with ( , )L UD D D  and positive for practices with D  > DU.  Holding all other 
characteristics constant, practices with b > b4 (or low enough marginal cost of treatment) will have D  
> DU and hence will have declared prevalence rates P/M which are greater than those with 
2 3( , )b b b  (or high enough marginal treatment cost). This suggests that a comparison of the 
reported prevalence rates of practices above and below the upper threshold, conditioning on 
observable practice and patient characteristics affecting cost parameters, true prevalence, and true 
exceptions, provides a test for gaming of prevalence reporting.  
 
But a test for gaming of prevalence by comparison of practices above and below the upper threshold 
faces the obvious difficulty that unobservable factors that directly increase reported prevalence (for 
example sicker patients) will make it less likely that a practice with given observable characteristics 
will be above the threshold.  Thus the estimated effect of being above the upper threshold would be 
biased downwards and could be negative even if practices were indeed gaming.   
 
Since the new 2004/5 contract embodying the QOF was a radical departure from the previous 
contract it is plausible that practices used their achieved performance in 2004/5 to inform decisions 
affecting 2005/6 performance. Those below the upper threshold would realise that they needed to 
increase treatment (N) or reduce reported prevalence (P) or increase exceptions (E) to generate 
additional QOF revenue in 2005/6.  Those above the upper threshold would know that they could only 
increase QOF revenue by increasing prevalence. Moreover, the average price per point increased by 
75% between 2004/5 and 2005/6. This increased the marginal rewards for reducing prevalence 
reporting for practices expecting to be under the threshold in 2005/6 and increased the marginal 
rewards for increasing reported prevalence for those expecting to be above the threshold in 2005/6.   
 
We therefore test for gaming of prevalence reporting by examining whether practices which were 
above the upper threshold in 2004/5 had a higher reported prevalence in 2005/6 than those which 
were above the upper threshold in 2004/5.  We regress reported prevalence in 2005/6 on a set of 
practice and patient characteristics to capture differences in costs, true prevalence and true 
exceptions, and a dummy U04/05 indicating whether the practice was above the upper threshold in 
2004/5.   
 
A positive coefficient on U04/05 is evidence for gaming provided that the unobservable factors affecting 
reported prevalence in 2005/5 are not positively correlated with U04/05, conditional on the patient and 
practice covariates. This is certainly the case if the unobservables affecting the 2005/6 reported 
prevalence rate, and the 2004/5 prevalence rate, numbers treated, and numbers excepted are 
uncorrelated. 
 
If the unobservables affecting 2004/5 and 2005/6 prevalence rates are positively correlated then, in 
the absence of gaming, the coefficient on U04/05 will be negative. Hence a positive coefficient on U04/05 
DU D 1 LD  0 
        N > 0 
        E = Eo 
        P = Po 
 
                            N > 0 
                            E t Eo 
                            P d Po 
 
N > 0 
E = Eo 
P t Po 
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would be even stronger evidence of gaming.  It is highly implausible that the unobservables affecting 
2004/5 and 2005/6 prevalence rates are negatively correlated.   
 
Even if there are persistent unobservable factors (for example some aspect of patient deprivation not 
captured in our deprivation measures) which increase prevalence and numbers treated, this does 
necessarily induce a positive correlation of U04/05 and the 2005/6 reported prevalence rate. An 
increase in N and P will increase achievement (N/(P  E)) only if the ratio of the increases in N and P 
exceeds N/(P  E).  Similarly persistent factors increasing E and P only induce a positive correlation 
of U04/05 and the 2005/6 reported prevalence rate if they have a larger effect on E than P.  For 
example, even though a practice with more unobserved deprivation might have a higher prevalence 
rate and be able to legitimately exception report more patients, this would induce a positive coefficient 
on U04/05 only if unobserved deprivation had a bigger effect on the probability that a prevalent patient 
is legitimately exception reported than on the prevalence rate.  
 
Since we also include a rich set of patient and practice characteristics (see section 4) in the 
prevalence regression model, and also run further models with practice fixed effects, we argue that 
positive coefficients on U04/05 from such regressions are evidence for gaming of prevalence.  
 
Exception reporting above and below the upper threshold 
 
We use a similar method of testing for gaming of exception reporting. Since marginal revenue from 
increased exception reporting is positive when ( , )L UD D D  and zero when D  > DU, practices with 
low enough costs of gaming exceptions will have more exceptions when their altruism parameter is 
low enough (or marginal cost of treatment is high enough) to ensure that they choose ( , )L UD D D  
than when it is high enough that they choose D  > DU.  The argument also implies that exceptions as a 
proportion of true prevalence Po will be higher in practices below the threshold. Since such practices 
will also have a lower declared prevalence, exceptions as a proportion of declared prevalence will 
also be higher for practices below the upper threshold.  
 
As with prevalence reporting, we cannot test for gaming by a regression of exception reporting rates 
in 2005/6 on U05/06 since unobserved factors increasing exceptions in 2005/6 will increase the 
likelihood that a practice is above the upper threshold in 2005/6.  Hence the test for gaming is biased 
towards rejection of gaming.  We therefore test for exception report gaming by regressing the 2005/6 
exception rate on practice and patient characteristics and the upper threshold indicator for 2004/5.  
Gaming would lead to higher exception reporting in 2005/6 for practices below the threshold in 2004/5 
compared to those above the upper threshold: the coefficient on U04/05 will be negative.  
 
As with the test of prevalence we argue that whilst it is not impossible that persistent unobservable 
factors increasing 2005/6 exceptions and reducing 2004/5 achievement could also explain a negative 
coefficient on U04/05, the use of a rich set of practice and patient covariates makes it unlikely.  We also 
use practice effects to remove such persistent factors. 
 
Effects of patient and practice characteristics on reported prevalence and exceptions 
 
Po and Eo (true prevalence and exceptions) depend on the characteristics of the practice population, 
not on the characteristics of the practice such as the age of GPs, their country of qualification or the 
type of practice contract. Gamed prevalence and exceptions will vary with practice characteristics that 
reflect GP cost or preference parameters and with patient characteristics.  Thus if practice 
characteristics are associated with reported prevalence and exception reporting, this suggests that 
practices are gaming exceptions, provided there are no omitted practice patient characteristics which 
affect true prevalence and exceptions and are correlated with included practice characteristics.   We 
include measures of practice population demographics, population morbidity, deprivation, rurality, and 
ethnicity to reduce this omitted variable problem. 
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4. Data and methods 
 
4.1  Data: covariates 
 
Practice characteristics 
 
Practice characteristics were taken from the GP Contractor Database held at the Information Services 
Division (ISD) of the Scottish Executive and are for 1 April 2005. They include practice list size, and 
the number, gender, ages and country of qualification of practice GPs (see Table 5). 
 
Before the introduction of the QOF, practices with a PMS contract (section 2.1) had a higher income 
than those with the standard General Medical Services contract. It is possible that they would 
therefore put less effort into QOF activities because of income effects. We therefore include an 
indicator PMS contract in the regression models. 
 
Most patients are required to take prescriptions to a community pharmacy to have the prescribed 
items dispensed. Where there is no community pharmacy available locally, practices are allowed to 
both prescribe and dispense items to patients. Dispensing practices are paid dispensing fees and are 
reimbursed for drugs dispensed at a rate which can exceed their actual cost to the practice. 
Dispensing practices have higher workload and income, and hence may respond less to the incentive 
effects of the QOF. We classified practices allowed to dispense directly to at least one of their patients 
as dispensing practices and include this as a covariate (Dispensing). Dispensing status is more 
common in more remote areas, but we also include a measure of rurality based on the size of local 
towns (Rurality) and the inverse of the population density (Sparsity) amongst the population 
covariates. 
 
Qualified GPs can apply to be trainers of newly qualified doctors intending to become GPs. We 
include GP trainers may provide better quality care This may indicate higher quality practice. But, 
trainee doctors may provide lower quality care. We therefore include a dummy variable Training 
indicating whether a practice has training status. 
 
Between 1991/2 and 1998/9 practices could opt to hold a budget to cover elective inpatient costs and 
drug costs for their patients (Dusheiko et al, 2006) and could retain any budget surplus to spend for 
the benefit of their patients.  Since fundholding scheme was voluntary, we use the practices 
participation in it as an indication that it was more alert to the financial implications of the QOF.  To 
allow for the creation of new practices since the end of fundholding we classify practices as new 
practices (New practice) if they were not in existence in 1999, and those that were in existence in 
1999 either as ex fundholders (Ex FH) or non-fundholders. Non-fundholders are the baseline category 
in the regressions.  
 
We constructed measure of the extent to which each practice faced potential competition from other 
practices. Scotland contains 6505 small areas (datazones) containing between 500 and 1000 
residents. We first calculated the Herfindahl index for each datazone based on the squared shares of 
the datazone population on the lists of different practices and then took a weighted average of the 
datazone Herfindahls where the weights were the proportion of the practice population drawn from 
each datazone. Since practices are paid a capitation payment for each patient registered with them, 
we expect practices to compete on the basis of quality and therefore that the Herfindahl index will be 
negatively correlated with quality.  
 
Around one third of practices in Scotland are part of the Scottish Programme for Improving Clinical 
Effectiveness in Primary Care (SPICE-PC) network. The network provides them every six with 
feedback on their relative performance on a wide range of indicators, some of which are included in 
the QOF.  The SPICE dummy equals 1 if the practice participated in the Autumn 2004 round of 
SPICE. Since the data for SPICE are extracted from computerised patient records, we expect SPICE 
participants to have had more comprehensive records prior to the introduction of the QOF and 
therefore higher prevalence.  
 
Practices have a choice of patient record computer systems. One of systems (GPASS) is subsidised 
by central government. The functionality of GPASS has been criticised and alternatives are perceived 
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to better enable practices to manage their QOF activities. We include information on the five types of 
computer system in use by practices as at March 2005. 
 
Population characteristics 
 
We use three measures of population health in the local area that we expect to be predictive of true 
prevalence. The Standardised Illness Ratio (SIR) is an indirectly age standardised measure of the 
proportion of people reporting a limiting long-term illness at the 2001 Census. Census data are 
available for each of 42,604 Census Output Areas containing on average 117 individuals in private 
households.  The Census also has information on self assessed health in three categories (good, 
fairly good and not good. We also calculated the Standardised Not Good Health Ratio for each 
Output Area as the indirectly standardised proportion of people reporting that their general health was 
not good. It was highly collinear with SIR and we do not report results from the regressions 
containing it. 
 
Our third measure of population health is the Standardised Mortality Ratio (SMR), an indirectly 
standardised measure calculated by ISD for each data zone using General Register Office death 
records for 1999 to 2003 and the 2001 Census population counts.  
 
The Census provided the proportion of residents in black and ethnic minority groups in each Output 
Area. Measures of the socio-economic status of practice populations are derived from the Scottish 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (www.scotland.gov.uk/stats/simd2004/). We use the scores for six 
deprivation domains: income; education; employment; housing; skills and training; and access to 
services.  The scores are available at data zone level. The ethnicity and deprivation variables are 
expected to affect prevalence and may influence some of the reasons for exceptions.  
 
The practice values of the measures of health, deprivation, and ethnicity variables were calculated as 
the average of the variable for each geographical area (output area or data zone) from which the 
practice draws its population weighted by the share of practice population in each geographical area.  
 
4.2  Measurement of QOF variables 
 
Data on practice achievement (N), numbers declared suitable for an indicator (D) and declared 
prevalence (P) for Scottish practices for 2004/5 and 2005/6 are from ISD (www.isdscotland.org/QOF). 
Only practice-level counts are available. 
 
We estimate models to test for gaming of exceptions and prevalence reporting.  For 2005/6 there are 
data on the numbers achieved for each indicator i in each disease domain k in each practice (Ngki), 
the numbers declared eligible for the indicator (Dgki) and the number exception reported  (Egki) as at 
31 March 2006. But, to speed up the payment of practices, reported prevalence for a disease domain 
Pgk is recorded on 14th February, six weeks before the end of the financial year.  
 
Exception and prevalence measures  
The relationship between exceptions and numbers declared for indicator i in domain k by practice g is 
 
Dgki  + Egki = Pgk + Agk =  TgkP                           (1) 
 
where Agk is the number of additional patients found by the practice in disease domain k between 15th 
February and 31
st
 March.  At 31
st
 March the total number of patients the practice could potentially 
declare for the denominator of the indicator is the number of patients in the disease domain declared 
as prevalent on 14
th
 February plus new patients recorded between 15
th
 February and 31
st
 March as 
having the disease: 
T
gkP  = Pgk + Agk.  Although Agk is not recorded we do know Dgki,  Egki, and Pgk for 
2005/6 and hence can calculate 
T
gkP  = Dgki  + Egki.  We measure the exception reporting rate for 
indicator i in disease domain k as Egki/ (Dgki  + Egki).  
 
We expect that age and sex mix of the practice population will affect reported prevalence Pgk since 
demography is the main determinant of true prevalence. We could allow for demographics by 
including the age and gender proportions of the practice population as explanatory variables.  This 
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would have a cost in terms of degrees of freedom and would assume no interaction between the 
effects of demography and other variables. We have instead used the indirectly standardised reported 
prevalence ratio as the dependent variable in the regressions investigating reported prevalence.  
 
Expected prevalence figures for each practice were obtained by applying age and sex specific 
prevalence rates, obtained directly from practice records in a reference sample of 44 practices, to all 
practice populations.
11  
The indirectly standardised reported prevalence ratio was obtained by dividing 
the number of prevalent patients reported on 14 February 2005 (Pgk) by the expected number ˆgkP  
and multiplying by 100.
12
 We report prevalence regressions for 2005/6 in eight of the eleven disease 
domains because of the lack of information on age and sex specific prevalence rates in cancer, 
mental health, and LVD.  The correlation between raw reported prevalence rates and indirectly 
standardised prevalence ratios for 2005/6 across all practices and the eight disease domains was 
0.83 (p<0.001). 
 
Upper threshold measures 
 
We test for differences in prevalence reporting and exception reporting between practices that are 
above and below the upper threshold.  For individual indicators we use a dummy variable 
gki
tU  (upper 
threshold) taking the value 1 if practice g had reported achievement (Ngkit/Dgkit) above the upper 
threshold kiUD  for indicator i in disease domain k in year t. 
 
Prevalence reporting affects points and the value per point for all indicators in a domain.  For models 
of prevalence reporting we include a measure of the average extent to which practice g was above 
the upper threshold in domain k in year t:  gktU = /
o gki o
ki t kii i
US S¦ ¦  (domain upper) where okiS  is 
the maximum number of points available for indicator i in disease domain k. 
 
4.3  Estimation  
 
Prevalence reporting 
 
For 2005/6 prevalence reporting we estimate a pooled model for the indirectly age and sex 
standardised prevalence ratio 
0 1 2 04 / 05100
ˆ
gk gk
j gj gkj
gk
P
x h U
P
E E E J H§ ·     ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹ ¦ ¦ ""              (2) 
where ˆgkP is the expected number of prevalent patients for disease k in practice g given the age and 
sex composition of the practice. The Scottish NHS is administered through 15 Health Boards and we 
include Health Board dummies gh "  to allow for differences in local policies or area characteristics not 
reflected in the covariates gx . Since the dependent variable is an indirectly standardised ratio which 
has the same mean value (100) across disease domains we do not include disease domain dummies.  
 
We estimate eight separate disease domain models 
 0 1 2 04 / 05100
ˆ
gk gk
k kj gj k g k gkj
gk
P
x h U
P
E E E J H§ ·     ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹ ¦ ¦ " ""                       (3) 
To allow for the effects of the covariates and the domain upper threshold variable to differ across 
diseases. 
 
                                                 
11
http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/servlet/controller?p_service=Content.show&p_applic=CCC&pContentID=1044 
12
 100*Pgk/ ˆ 100* / ogk kag ag ka gaa aP p pZ Z ¦ ¦  where okap   is the true prevalence rate for disease k in age and sex strata a 
in the reference sample practices,  pkag is the unobserved reported prevalence rate for disease k in age and sex strata a in 
practice g, Za is the proportion of sample practices population in age and sex strata a and Zag is the proportion of the 
population of practice g in age and sex strata a.  
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We also estimate a model with practice fixed effects 
 0 1 04 / 05100
ˆ
gk gk
g g gkg
gk
P
D U
P
G G J Hc cc
§ ·    ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹ ¦             (4) 
where Dg is the dummy variable for practice g.  The advantage of this specification is that the practice 
fixed effects will pick up all unobserved practice characteristics and thereby reduce the risk that the 
estimated coefficient on the domain upper threshold variables are biased.  The disadvantage is that J 
may be estimated imprecisely as it is based only on the variation in reported prevalence across the 
eight diseases domains with practices. 
 
The three prevalence ratio specifications are estimated by Weighted Least Squares, using the 
practice populations as weights. Estimation of the standard errors for equation (11) allows for 
clustering within practices.  
 
Exception reporting 
We estimate a 2005/6 exception rate model pooled over the 65 indicators 
0 1 2 3 04 / 05
gki gki
j gj g k i k i gkiT j k i
gk
E
x h d U
P
E E E E J Hc c c cc c     ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦""          (5) 
where 
T
gkP  = Dgki + Egki is the sum of the number of patients declared suitable for the indicator and the 
number exception reported.  We allow for the incentive effect of the upper threshold and the effects of 
the covariates to differ across the indicators by estimating separate models for the 65 indicators 
 0 1 2 04 / 05
gki gki
ki kij gj ki g ki gkiT j
gk
E
x h U
P
E E E J H    ¦ ¦ ""            (6) 
and we also estimate model with practice fixed effects 
0 1 2 04 / 05
gki gki
g g ki g gkiT g
gk
E
D h U
P
G G G J Hc cc    ¦ ¦ ""           (7) 
 
We estimate these three exception reporting models using Weighted Least Squares, using 
T
gkP  = Dgki 
+ Egki as weights. However, there is a non-trivial proportion of zero exception rates and many rates 
are very small. We therefore also estimate a negative binomial model for Egki using TgkP  = Dgki + Egki as 
the exposure term. We allow for clustering within practices in the pooled model (14).  
 
5. Results 
 
Although the Department of Health had forecast that practices would achieve 75% of the maximum 
points in the first year of the scheme, the mean score was over 90% and in 2005/6 it had increased to 
97.5%, with 15% of practices achieving maximum points.   Many practices treated more patients than 
necessary to achieve the maximum points on indicators.  The percentage of cases where practices 
were above the upper threshold increased from 75.5% in 2004/5 to 91.8% in 2005/6.  Practices above 
the upper threshold in 2005/6 could have reduced the number treated in 2005/6 by 11.8% without 
reducing their QOF revenue.
13
   
                                                 
13
 The averages are weighted by the maximum points achievable for each indicator.  Thus the percentage of cases above the upper threshold in 
2005/6 is    105 / 06100 o ogkig k i k i kikiU GS S u ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  where 05 / 06gkiU  = 1 if practice g is above the upper threshold for indicator i in 
domain k, okiS  is the maximum points achievable for indicator i in domain k and G the total number of practices. The percentage reduction in 
numbers treated in cases above the threshold which would have been possible without reducing QOF revenue is  
 
[ ]
100 k i g gki
k i g gki
n
N
¦ ¦ ¦u ¦ ¦ ¦   
where [ngki] is the integer part of Ngki(Dgki  DUki)/ Dgki  where Dgki is achievement by practice g for indicator i in domain k, DkiU is the upper threshold, 
Ngki is the number of patients for whom practice g achieved indicator i in domain k, and the sums are over practices above the threshold for the 
indicator 
Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance contract: further evidence from the quality and outcomes framework   15 
 
Table 4 shows, for the 65 clinical indicators, the maximum points available, the upper threshold, the 
percentage of practices achieving the upper threshold, practices reported achievement (N/D), 
delivered quality (N/(D+E)) and exception reporting (E/( D+E).  Mean practice exception reporting in 
2005/6 ranges from 0.7% (BP3) to 27.6% (CHD10). 
 
The percentage achieving the upper threshold in 2004/5 varied from 35.0% (DM13) to 98.6% (DM11). 
Delivered quality is lower than reported achievement, by virtue of its definition, but is also more 
variable across practices. Appendix D has results from regressions of reported achievement and 
delivered quality on practice and patient characteristics and shows that delivered quality was lower in 
practices with more income deprived patients, with a higher proportion from ethnic minorities, and with 
larger lists. 
 
5.1 Reported prevalence 
 
We hypothesised that practices that expect to be below the upper threshold may under report 
prevalence and those who expected to be above the threshold over report. Table 6 has results from 
two models of prevalence reporting for 2005/6, using data pooled across 8 disease domains. The 
coefficients on the covariates are similar across models and generally plausible. Reported prevalence 
is higher in practices with populations with a higher standardised illness ratio. Reported prevalence is 
higher in practices with younger GPs. It is lower in practices with larger populations and higher in 
practices with more GPs per patient, suggesting that such practices have a lower cost of case finding. 
SPICE participants and practices with two of the unsubsidised computer systems report higher 
prevalence.  
 
The first model includes a variable upper domain ( 05/ 06
gkU ) measuring the average extent to which the 
practice was above the upper threshold for the indicators in the disease domain in 2005/6. But 
whether the practice is above or below the upper threshold is endogenous, and so, as we argued in 
section 3.2, the coefficient on 05/ 06
gkU  in a model of prevalence reporting for 2005/6 will be biased 
downward.  The second model uses lag upper domain ( 04 / 05
gkU ), measuring the extent to which the 
practice was above the upper thresholds in previous year.  The coefficient on lag upper domain is 
positive and significant, suggesting that practices gamed prevalence reporting in 2005/6.  
 
As we argued in section 3.2 the use of rich set of covariates makes it unlikely that the positive 
coefficient on 04 / 05
gkU  is due to persistent unobservable factors increasing 2005/6 prevalence and 
increasing 2004/5 achievement. Moreover, such persistent factors should also increase 2005/6 
achievement and produce a similar sized coefficients on 05/ 06
gkU . The fact that the coefficient on  
05/ 06
gkU  in model 1 is negative whilst that on  04 / 05
gkU  in model 2 is positive suggests that the negative 
coefficient on 04 / 05
gkU  is evidence for gaming of exceptions, rather than arising from persistent 
unobservable factors. 
 
The coefficient on 04 / 05
gkU  in model 2 suggests that being above the upper threshold in 2004/5 
increased reported standardised prevalence in 2005/6 by 3.5% of its mean. 
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Table 4.  Ratio clinical indicators: rates of achievement, delivered quality, exception reporting. Scotland 2005/6 
Indicator Definition Max 
points  
Upper 
threshold 
(%) 
% practices 
achieving upper 
threshold 2004/5 
Reported 
achievement 
2005/6 
 (%) 
Delivered quality  
2005/6 
(%) 
Exception 
reporting  
2005/6  
(%) 
Effect on exception reporting 
rate 2005/6 of being above 
upper threshold in 2004/5 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Negbin model  
(7) 
    Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Coef t 
ASTHMA02 Diagnosis confirmed 15 70 80.2 39.8 88.8 9.7 83.2 11.9 6.4 7.2 -0.541 -5.880 
ASTHMA03 Teenagers smoking record 6 70 79.5 40.4 85.3 10.3 80.1 11.2 6.1 8.0 -0.036 -0.302 
ASTHMA04 Adults smoking record 6 70 98.3 13.1 94.9 4.1 92.4 4.5 2.6 3.0 -0.855 -2.008 
ASTHMA05 Smoking cessation advice. 6 70 93.4 24.8 90.2 7.4 85.2 8.5 5.6 6.8 -0.298 -1.678 
ASTHMA06 Reviewed in last 15 months 20 70 64.4 47.9 81.0 10.9 74.0 10.9 8.7 8.8 -0.087 -1.167 
ASTHMA07 Received flu jab 12 70 51.1 50.0 78.3 11.1 57.5 8.5 26.6 11.3 0.074 2.572 
BP02 Smoking record 10 90 90.3 29.6 98.3 1.7 97.1 2.2 1.2 1.2 -0.474 -5.037 
BP03 Smoking cessation advice 10 90 83.6 37.1 98.3 2.4 97.6 2.8 0.7 1.4 -0.851 -6.181 
BP04 BP recorded in last 9 months 20 90 59.8 49.1 93.4 4.5 91.4 4.6 2.2 2.4 -0.070 -1.049 
BP05 BP  150/90 56 70 66.4 47.2 79.2 7.1 74.7 7.4 5.7 4.0 -0.256 -5.685 
CANCER02 Reviewed within 6 months of diagnosis 6 90 65.9 47.4 93.7 8.9 87.3 10.1 6.8 5.6 -0.132 -2.202 
CHD02 Exercise test or specialist assessment 7 90 57.1 49.5 91.5 12.0 84.2 13.3 8.0 7.8 -0.266 -3.553 
CHD03 Smoking record 7 90 89.7 30.4 97.5 2.6 95.7 3.0 1.8 1.7 0.048 0.405 
CHD04 Smoking cessation advice 4 90 74.9 43.4 95.8 4.6 92.7 5.4 3.3 3.5 -0.186 -2.160 
CHD05 BP record in last 15 months 7 90 90.3 29.6 97.6 2.5 95.4 3.0 2.2 2.1 -0.144 -1.328 
CHD06 BP  150/90 19 70 95.0 21.9 89.3 5.2 85.3 5.5 4.4 3.2 -0.264 -1.903 
CHD07 Cholesterol measured in last 15 months 7 90 62.0 48.6 94.4 4.7 90.4 5.2 4.3 3.4 -0.010 -0.181 
CHD08 Cholesterol  5mmol/l 16 60 80.5 39.7 80.5 8.6 72.0 7.8 10.6 5.5 0.003 0.061 
CHD09 Takes Aspirin  7 90 58.9 49.2 95.4 3.2 92.2 3.5 3.4 2.6 -0.135 -2.609 
CHD10 Treated with beta blocker 7 50 96.1 19.5 75.6 11.7 54.7 6.5 27.6 11.1 0.053 0.584 
CHD11 Treated with ACE inhibitor 7 70 87.3 33.3 86.9 8.8 78.8 9.8 9.3 8.7 -0.299 -3.183 
CHD12 Received flu jab 7 86 66.0 47.4 93.1 4.8 80.3 5.9 13.7 6.0 -0.056 -1.880 
COPD02 Diagnosispost April 04 confirmed 5 90 55.2 49.8 91.9 11.6 84.4 13.8 8.2 8.0 -0.460 -7.041 
COPD03 Diagnosis pre April 04 confirmed 5 90 48.1 50.0 92.9 12.1 82.5 13.4 11.2 9.3 -0.226 -3.751 
COPD04 Smoking record 6 90 85.7 35.1 96.9 3.7 93.8 4.7 3.2 3.2 -0.158 -1.664 
COPD05 Smoking cessation advice. 6 90 79.7 40.2 95.8 5.0 92.1 6.2 3.9 4.3 -0.106 -1.029 
COPD06 FeV1 recorded in last 15 months 6 70 63.2 48.3 89.0 14.6 77.2 15.3 13.2 10.5 -0.260 -4.549 
COPD07 Inhaled technique checked last 2 years. 6 90 49.1 50.0 92.2 10.2 85.3 11.2 7.5 6.5 -0.170 -2.736 
COPD08 Flu jab 6 85 75.7 42.9 93.6 5.4 79.6 7.3 14.9 7.1 -0.107 -2.817 
DM02 BMI record in last 15 months 3 90 82.6 38.0 96.0 3.2 92.5 4.0 3.6 2.8 -0.246 -3.589 
DM03 Smoking recorded in last 15 months 3 90 97.1 16.9 98.5 1.8 97.0 2.4 1.5 1.5 -0.061 -0.250 
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DM04 Smoking cessation advice 5 90 79.2 40.6 96.1 4.9 92.8 6.2 3.4 3.9 -0.269 -2.510 
DM05 HbA1c recorded in last 15 months 3 90 93.7 24.3 97.8 2.1 94.8 3.1 3.0 2.2 -0.265 -2.604 
DM06 HbA1C  7.4 16 50 77.6 41.7 59.8 10.5 51.8 10.0 13.3 8.5 -0.166 -3.112 
DM07 HbA1C  10 11 85 85.7 35.0 92.1 3.8 86.4 4.9 6.3 3.8 -0.135 -2.401 
DM08 Retinal screening in last 15 months 5 90 51.8 50.0 92.9 7.1 86.1 7.7 7.2 5.4 -0.149 -3.287 
DM09 Peripheral pulses recorded in last 15 months 3 90 47.1 49.9 90.7 7.5 84.8 8.6 6.5 4.9 -0.205 -4.513 
DM10 Neuropathy test 3 90 43.2 49.6 90.0 7.9 84.0 9.0 6.6 5.0 -0.190 -4.219 
DM11 BP record in last 15 months 3 90 98.6 11.8 98.7 1.4 96.9 2.2 1.8 1.7 -0.452 -2.143 
DM12 BP  145/85 17 55 95.5 20.7 79.1 8.5 73.1 9.1 7.6 4.5 -0.467 -4.364 
DM13 Micor-albuminuria record in last 15 months 3 90 35.0 47.7 87.5 11.0 81.4 11.6 7.0 5.9 -0.219 -4.035 
DM14 Serum creatinine recorded in last 15 months 3 90 86.9 33.7 96.9 3.3 94.1 4.6 2.9 2.7 -0.231 -2.565 
DM15 Treated with ACE inhibitor 3 70 82.2 38.3 85.2 10.1 78.1 11.0 8.3 8.6 -0.335 -3.338 
DM16 Cholesterol record in last 15 months 3 90 86.7 34.0 96.7 2.6 93.9 3.4 2.9 2.3 -0.245 -3.437 
DM17 Cholesterol < 5mmol/l 6 60 89.5 30.6 81.3 7.4 73.0 7.4 10.3 4.9 -0.078 -1.405 
DM18 Flu jab 3 85 66.8 47.1 92.1 5.4 77.2 6.5 16.2 6.7 -0.020 -0.661 
EPILEP02 Seizure frequency record in last 15 months 4 90 80.5 39.7 96.4 5.9 90.6 8.3 5.9 6.8 -0.105 -1.039 
EPILEP03 Medication review in last 15 months 4 90 76.5 42.4 95.7 6.9 89.9 9.2 6.1 7.2 -0.119 -1.265 
EPILEP04 Seizure free in last 12 months 6 70 36.5 48.2 71.2 14.1 55.8 13.0 21.6 14.4 0.103 2.073 
LVD02 Diagnosis confirmed 6 90 62.9 48.4 94.1 10.3 88.2 12.5 6.3 8.3 -0.385 -3.569 
LVD03 Treated with ACE 10 70 89.0 31.3 87.0 8.2 78.8 9.0 9.4 8.6 -0.477 -5.335 
MH02 Reviewed in last 15 months 23 90 83.6 37.1 96.3 4.5 90.8 8.9 5.7 8.4 -0.222 -1.623 
MH03 Lithium levels checked if on lithium 3 90 73.1 44.4 96.7 7.3 92.2 9.7 4.6 7.2 -0.194 -1.304 
MH04 Seum creatinine /TSH checked if on lithium 3 90 75.4 43.1 95.9 9.5 91.9 11.7 4.1 6.6 -0.205 -1.316 
MH05 Lithium level in therapeutic range 5 90 73.5 44.2 95.8 8.3 88.4 11.4 7.7 8.9 -0.137 -1.071 
STROKE02 Confirmed by CT / MRI 2 80 78.0 41.4 92.2 9.7 85.8 11.7 7.0 7.2 -0.417 -4.431 
STROKE03 Smoking record in last 15 months 3 90 84.1 36.6 96.4 3.4 93.4 4.3 3.1 3.2 -0.191 -2.077 
STROKE04 Smoking cessation advice 2 70 94.4 23.1 93.5 6.3 89.4 7.5 4.3 5.3 -0.326 -1.486 
STROKE05 BP record in last 15 months 2 90 85.7 35.1 97.0 2.9 93.7 4.1 3.4 3.5 -0.264 -2.766 
STROKE06 BP < 150/90 5 70 90.0 30.0 87.9 6.0 81.9 6.8 6.8 4.9 -0.377 -4.541 
STROKE07 Cholesterol record in last 15 months 2 90 51.5 50.0 92.6 6.2 86.1 7.2 7.0 5.5 -0.023 -0.411 
STROKE08 Chol. < 5mmol/l 5 60 65.0 47.7 76.8 9.6 65.5 9.3 14.7 7.8 -0.071 -1.716 
STROKE09 Aspirin treatment 4 90 61.3 48.7 94.9 3.8 90.7 4.7 4.4 3.6 -0.172 -2.880 
STROKE10 Flu jab 2 85 56.0 49.7 90.5 6.3 75.5 7.3 16.6 7.4 -0.019 -0.639 
THYROI02 Thyroid function test in last 15 months 6 90 91.3 28.2 96.9 3.0 96.0 3.1 0.9 1.2 -0.102 -0.664 
Reported achievement: N/D; delivered quality: N/(D+E); Exception reporting: E/(D+E).  Denominator weighted means over Scottish practices. 
Separate Negbin models for each indicator also contain all variables in pooled exception rate model except for indicator dummies.  
18    CHE Research Paper 34 
 
Table 5.  Summary statistics: explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Patient characteristics      
Prop d15  Proportion of patients aged 15 or less  0.165 0.028 0.026 0.270 
Prop >75 Proportion of patients over 75 years 0.069 0.020 0.007 0.159 
SIR Standardised illness ratio 98.842 22.619 50.533 186.742 
SMR Standardised mortality ratio 107.991 25.092 44.199 329.250 
Income depriv IMD income deprivation score 15.050 7.519 2.801 43.409 
Education depriv IMD education deprivation score 0.001 0.591 -1.583 1.671 
Employment depriv IMD employment deprivation score 14.038 6.305 3.089 36.466 
Housing depriv IMD housing deprivation score 19.855 10.981 4.900 60.313 
Access depriv IMD access deprivation score -0.020 0.446 -1.118 2.719 
Ethnicity Minority ethnic group proportion 0.021 0.028 0.000 0.408 
Rural Population mode in settlements <3,000 
people 
0.101 0.301 0.000 1.000 
Sparsity Inverse of population density (hectares per 
person) 
1.354 4.625 0.014 117.289 
      
Practice characteristics      
List 1000 List size in 000s 5.471 3.251 0.174 19.171 
GP/list 1000 GPs per 1,000 patients 0.973 0.710 0.263 8.000 
Prop female GP Proportion of female GPs  0.423 0.252 0.000 1.000 
Av GP age Average age of GPs (years) 44.747 5.801 28.250 67.000 
Prop GP not UK qual Proportion of GPs not qualified in UK 0.092 0.217 0.000 1.000 
PMS contract PMS contract 0.092 0.290 0.000 1.000 
Dispensing Practice dispenses medicines 0.108 0.311 0.000 1.000 
Training Practice is a training practice 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 
Ex FH Ex fundholding practice 0.461 0.499 0.000 1.000 
New practice Practice formed since 1999 0.065 0.247 0.000 1.000 
Non-FH Practice was not a fundholder (baseline) 0.474 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Herfindahl Herfindahl index for areas served 0.353 0.244 0.083 0.998 
SPICE  Practice in SPICE network in Autumn 2004 0.329 0.470 0.000 1.000 
Patient Inflow Proportion patients registered in last year 0.069 0.042 0.006 0.845 
Software: Egton Uses Egton Medical Information Systems 
software 
0.054    
Software: GPASS Uses GPASS  software  (baseline) 0.863    
Software: In Practice Uses In Practice Systems software 0.053    
Software: Protechnic Uses Protechnic Exeter software 0.009    
Software: iSoft Uses iSoft software 0.022    
      
Based on 916 practices. Patient characteristics are weighted by list size. Practice characteristics are unweighted. 
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Table 6  Determinants of prevalence reporting in Scottish practices 2005/6: pooled models 
 
Dependent variable Standardised reported prevalence ratio 2005/6
1 
 Coef. t Coef. t 
dom upper 
-3.299 -1.51   
dom upper_lag  3.461 3.07
SIR 0.501 4.08 0.531 4.32 
SMR 0.010 0.42 0.011 0.43 
Income depriv 0.095 0.35 0.114 0.42 
Education depriv 10.255 5.00 10.027 4.90 
Employment depriv -0.492 -1.10 -0.548 -1.24 
Housing depriv -0.175 -1.97 -0.190 -2.18 
Access depriv 2.438 1.69 2.082 1.46 
Ethnicity -52.386 -1.63 -52.220 -1.63 
Rural -1.131 -0.72 -1.283 -0.83 
Sparsity -0.366 -4.87 -0.367 -4.96 
List 1000 -0.475 -2.58 -0.484 -2.68 
GP/list 1000 5.163 3.82 5.246 3.91 
Prop female GP 4.038 2.14 3.764 2.01 
Av GP age -0.313 -3.67 -0.298 -3.51 
Prop GP not UK qual 0.796 0.31 0.936 0.37 
PMS contract 0.957 0.71 1.138 0.85 
Dispensing 0.170 0.10 0.302 0.19 
Training 0.391 0.46 0.314 0.37 
Ex FH 0.792 0.98 0.581 0.72 
New practice 2.046 1.40 1.911 1.32 
Herfindahl 2.884 1.28 3.474 1.57 
SPICE 3.345 4.23 3.100 3.95 
Patient Inflow -19.999 -1.64 -18.885 -1.58 
Software: Egton 2.885 1.95 2.530 1.70 
Software: In Practice 4.941 3.24 4.464 2.98 
Software: Protechnic -1.392 -0.53 -1.506 -0.59 
Software: iSoft 2.629 0.89 2.322 0.80 
Constant 70.498 7.22 61.603 6.62 
     
2R  0.2407  0.2416  
N 7449  7449  
 
1 
Age and sex indirectly standardised reported prevalence ratio 2005/6. 
N is number of number of disease domain - practice observations 
t stats are robust and allow for clustering within practices. OLS models are weighted by population size and 
include 14 NHS Board dummies.  
Domain upper:  proportion of indicators in domain for which practice achieved upper threshold in 2005/6  
weighted by max points for indicators  
Lag domain upper:  proportion of indicators in domain for which practice achieved upper threshold in 2004/5 
weighted by max points for indicators. 
 
Pooled models with alternative sets of covariates (not shown) produced similar coefficients on lag 
upper domain. However, the pooled model (2) forces the effects of the covariates to be the same for 
all disease domains. Given the differences in aetiology this is problematic. We therefore report in 
Table 7 the coefficients on lag upper domain from separate models (3) for standardised prevalence 
reporting in 2005/6 for the eight disease domains.  The effect of lag upper domain is positive in seven 
of the eight domains and is significant in five of them. 
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Table 7.  Determinants of prevalence reporting in Scottish practices 2005/6 
Disease: CHD Diabetes Asthma COPD Epilepsy BP Thyroid Stroke 
Lag domain upper 1.721 7.917 7.782 -0.4 2.079 2.938 5.635 6.876 
(t stat) 0.718 3.499 3.178 -0.107 0.869 1.973 2.096 2.262 
         
2R  0.6243 0.6145 0.1793 0.6230 0.4397 0.2381 0.5354 0.3538 
N 932 932 932 932 925 932 932 932 
 
Dependent variables: age and sex indirectly standardised disease reported prevalence ratio 2005/6.  All models 
included the covariates in Table 7 plus 14 NHS Board dummies.  OLS coefficient reported above robust t statistic 
adjusted for clustering within practices. 
Lag domain upper:  proportion of indicators in domain for which practice achieved upper threshold in 2004/5 
weighted by max points for indicators. 
 
We also estimated the pooled 2005/6 prevalence reporting model (4) with practice fixed effects.  The 
coefficient on lag upper domain is again positive 1.627 (t =1.20) but smaller than in Table 6 and not 
significant.  By including practice fixed effects in the regression model we remove all unobservable 
practice variables but leave only the variation of prevalence across 8 domains within the practice to 
be explained by the lag upper domain variable. Since practices which were above indicator thresholds 
in one disease domain tended to be above them in other disease domains, there is relatively little 
variation in lag upper domain within practices. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the coefficient 
on lag upper domain is not precisely estimated.    
 
5.2 Exception reporting 
 
Table 8 has the results for the OLS and NegBin regressions of 2005/6 exception reporting pooled 
over 65 indicators. The coefficients on the patient characteristic covariates are similar in the two 
models and are plausible. Exception reporting is lower in practices with older populations, higher in 
practices with sicker patients and with populations drawn from areas with a higher ethnic minority 
proportion. Exception rates are lower in rural areas.  
 
Since the rate of true exceptions are is determined by patient characteristics, our first test for gaming  
is whether the reported exception rate varies with practice characteristics which ought not to affect 
true exceptions. Table 8 shows that practices that were fundholding have higher exception reporting. 
Training practices have lower exception reporting. SPICE participants and practices with higher 
Herfindahls have higher exception reporting.  These results suggest that practices were gaming their 
exceptions.   
 
Our more direct test of gaming uses the difference in incentives for practices above and below the 
upper threshold. The coefficients on the upper threshold ( 05/ 06
gkiU ) dummy (which equals 1 if the 
practice is above the upper threshold for the indicator in 2005/6) are positive and highly significant. 
We interpret this as evidence of endogeneity bias since errors unobserved factors increasing 2005/6 
exceptions will also increase achievement and hence make it more likely that the practice is above 
the upper threshold in 2005/6.  
 
The models using Lag upper threshold ( 04 / 05
gkiU ) provide strong evidence of gaming: the coefficients 
on Lag upper threshold are negative and highly significant. Pooled models with subsets of the 
deprivation measures and including the measure of self assessed health produced similar coefficients 
on lag upper threshold.  
 
For the 14,384 of the 56,980 practice-indicator cases where achievement was below the threshold in 
2004/5 the mean exception rate in 2005/6 was 8.55%. Using the NegBin results for model 2 we 
calculate that if achievement had been above the upper threshold in 2004/5 reported exceptions 
would have been 7.25%.  Thus the incentive to overstate exceptions lead to non-trivial gaming in the 
25% of practice-indicator cases where practices were below the upper threshold in 2004/5. 
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Table 8. Determinants of exception reporting in Scottish practices 2005/6: pooled regressions 
 OLS models
1
Negative binomial models
2
 Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Upper threshold 1.025 6.47   0.092 4.88   
Lag upper threshold   -0.729 -6.91   -0.165 -11.75 
Prop d15  2.609 0.89 3.541 1.2 -0.084 -0.2 0.095 0.22 
Prop >75 -8.588 -2.66 -9.326 -2.88 -1.117 -2.22 -1.154 -2.29 
SIR 0.005 0.41 -0.003 -0.28 -0.002 -1.29 -0.003 -1.9 
SMR 0.004 1.08 0.004 1.18 0.001 1.89 0.001 2.03 
Income depriv 0.103 2.6 0.094 2.39 0.024 3.82 0.021 3.43 
Education depriv -0.757 -2.74 -0.731 -2.66 -0.108 -2.63 -0.106 -2.59 
Employment depriv -0.069 -1.19 -0.046 -0.81 -0.014 -1.62 -0.010 -1.15 
Housing depriv 0.032 2.52 0.038 2.97 0.002 0.84 0.003 1.34 
Access depriv -0.223 -1.04 -0.194 -0.91 -0.069 -2.14 -0.059 -1.84 
Ethnicity 9.912 2.68 9.214 2.57 0.965 2.22 0.920 2.14 
Rural -0.936 -4.8 -0.908 -4.68 -0.167 -4.94 -0.161 -4.77 
Sparsity -0.018 -1.83 -0.018 -1.79 -0.002 -1.6 -0.002 -1.51 
List 1000 -0.007 -0.37 -0.008 -0.41 0.004 1.26 0.004 1.32 
GP/list 1000 0.235 1.35 0.246 1.41 0.070 2.88 0.068 2.78 
Prop female GP -0.152 -0.58 -0.080 -0.31 0.014 0.39 0.028 0.76 
Av GP age 0.008 0.66 0.005 0.43 0.000 0.06 0.000 -0.28 
Prop GP not UK qual 0.193 0.56 0.134 0.39 0.055 1.12 0.056 1.13 
PMS contract 0.510 2.85 0.482 2.68 0.045 1.7 0.037 1.39 
Dispensing -0.311 -1.26 -0.345 -1.4 -0.055 -1.19 -0.065 -1.43 
Training -0.204 -1.52 -0.200 -1.49 -0.046 -2.16 -0.040 -1.92 
Ex FH 0.492 4.15 0.540 4.55 0.066 3.7 0.073 4.06 
New practice 0.139 0.68 0.169 0.82 0.007 0.22 0.011 0.35 
Herfindahl 0.947 2.92 0.847 2.63 0.127 2.43 0.109 2.11 
SPICE 0.272 2.18 0.328 2.63 0.049 2.65 0.059 3.21 
Patient Inflow -0.756 -0.63 -1.083 -0.89 -0.062 -0.28 -0.081 -0.37 
Software: Egton -0.642 -3.06 -0.582 -2.78 -0.004 -0.09 0.007 0.18 
Software: In Practice -0.747 -3.2 -0.643 -2.8 -0.114 -3.42 -0.093 -2.85 
Software: Protechnic 0.709 1.09 0.702 1.09 0.170 1.83 0.160 1.75 
Software: iSoft -0.542 -2.03 -0.465 -1.77 -0.037 -0.77 -0.023 -0.5 
Constant 2.322 1.86 4.531 3.63 -3.051 -16.89 -2.775 -15.49 
         
2R  0.6011  0.6012      
Initial Log L     -166132.07  -166132.07  
Model Log L     -147920.48  -147762.1  
N 56980  56980  56980  56980  
1
 OLS models: dependent variable is the exception reporting rate [100*E/(D+E)]  
2
 Negative binomial regressions of E using (D+E) as the exposure term 
All models also contain 14 NHS Board dummies and 64 indicator dummies. Robust t statistics allow for clustering of indicators 
in practices. 
Upper threshold = 1 if practice above upper threshold in 2005/6 for indicator, 0 otherwise. 
Lag upper threshold = 1 if practice above upper threshold in 2004/5 for indicator, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
The fact that the coefficient on 04 / 05
gkiU  in model 2 is negative and significant whereas the coefficient 
on 05/ 06
gkiU  in model 1 is positive and significant suggests that the negative coefficient on 04 / 05
gkiU  is due 
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to gaming rather than to persistent unobservable factors negatively correlated with 2004/5 
achievement and 2005/6 exceptions.  
 
We also estimated separate OLS and NegBin models (6) for the 65 indicators. We report the NegBin 
coefficients on Lag upper threshold from these models in column (7) of Table 4. Only five of the 
indicators have positive coefficients on Lag upper threshold and two of these is significant.  All the 
other 60 coefficients are negative and 36 of them are significant.  
 
Models with practice fixed effects also provide strong evidence of gaming.  The coefficient on Lag 
upper threshold in the NegBin model was 0.081 with a z statistic of 12.05.  
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The introduction of the QOF may have had its intended consequence: the first year of the QOF seems 
to show above trend performance against some clinical indicators.  Practice behaviour is compatible 
with quasi-altruism: overall practices could have reduced the number of patients treated by 11.8% 
without reducing their revenue from the QOF.    
 
Delivered quality was inequitable with respect to the income and ethnicity of the populations in the 
areas from which practices drew their lists.  This is in contrast with consultations with general 
practitioners: allowing for morbidity, income has no effect on consultations, and some ethnic minority 
groups have more than expected numbers of consultations (Morris, Sutton and Gravelle, 2005).  
Similar results were obtained in earlier studies of the first year of the QOF in Scotland (McLean et al, 
2006) and England (Doran et al, 2006). However in the absence of pre-QOF evidence on the 
relationship between the QOF quality indicators and socio-economic characteristics it is unclear 
whether the introduction of the QOF increased or reduced inquity. Practices with more female GPs 
and with younger GPs deliver higher quality.   
 
There is also evidence of gaming. First, both true prevalence and reported exceptions are determined 
by patient characteristics. But we found that they also varied with practice characteristics such as the 
average age of the GPs in the practice or the total number of patients, or whether the practice had 
held a budget under the fundholding scheme.  These are factors which plausibly affect GP costs or 
reflect their preferences and hence their reporting decisions but which should not affect true 
prevalence or exceptions. 
 
Second, differences in the behaviour of practices above and below the upper threshold for indicators, 
where there is a sharp discontinuity in reporting incentives, also suggests gaming of reporting. 
Practices which were above the upper threshold in 2004/5 had reported standardised prevalence in 
2005/6 which was 3.5% greater, against a mean of 100, than if they had been below the upper 
threshold in 2004/5. Practices below the upper threshold in 2004/5 had an average exception rate of 
8.55% in 2005/6 and we estimate that without the incentive to increase their exceptions they would 
have had an exception rate of 7.25 %.   
 
The ratio performance indicators in the QOF were intended to incentivise doctors to increase the 
numerator by treating more patients.  But ratio indicators also create incentives to manipulate the 
denominators. Earlier more limited quality incentive schemes paid practices fixed sums only if more 
than a specified percentage of women aged 25 to 64 were screened for cervical cancer or if more 
than they vaccinated more than a specified percentage of children on their list.  The earlier schemes 
did not permit exception reporting so that the only way GPs could reduce the denominator to achieve 
the target was to remove patients from their lists.  GPs recognised the financial incentive to 
manipulate the denominator (Pickin et al, 2001) but, perhaps because of the more severe implications 
for the removed patients, there were few documented cases of them doing so. The QOF makes it 
easier for practices to manipulate the denominator without direct harm to patients and our evidence 
suggests that some practices did so. 
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Appendices  
 
A.  Grounds for exception reporting 
A) patients who have been recorded as refusing to attend review who have been invited on at least 
three occasions during the preceding twelve months  
B) patients for whom it is not appropriate to review the chronic disease parameters due to particular 
circumstances eg terminal illness, extreme frailty  
C) patients newly diagnosed within the practice or who have recently registered with the practice, who 
should have measurements made within three months and delivery of clinical standards within nine 
months eg blood pressure or cholesterol measurements within target levels  
D) patients who are on maximum tolerated doses of medication whose levels remain sub-optimal  
E) patients for whom prescribing a medication is not clinically appropriate eg those who have an 
allergy, another contraindication or have experienced an adverse reaction  
F) where a patient has not tolerated medication  
G) where a patient does not agree to investigation or treatment (informed dissent), and this has been 
recorded in their medical records  
H) where the patient has a supervening condition which makes treatment of their condition 
inappropriate eg cholesterol reduction where the patient has liver disease  
I) where an investigative service or secondary care service is unavailable.  
 
Source: GMS Statement of Financial Entitlements, 30 March 2005.  
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B.  Reported prevalence and revenue 
 
Notation 
Pgk prevalent patients reported in disease domain k by practice 
g 
Dgki patients declared suitable for indicator i in domain k 
Egki = Pgk – Dgki number of patients exception reported for indicator i 
Ngki number of patients for whom indicator i achieved 
Dgki = Ngki/Dgki reported achievement rate for indicator i 
kiLD  lower achievement threshold for indicator i 
DkiU upper achievement threshold for indicator i 
Sgki=Ski(Dgki) points achieved for indicator i 
o
kiS  maximum points achievable for indicator i 
Mg practice population 
V national average price (value) per point 
vgk = vFgk /gM M  value per point for indicators in domain k in practice g 
1 1
2 21 Ggk hk
gk h
g h
P PF
M G M
§ ·§ · § ·¨ ¸ y¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹© ¹ © ¹
¦  
adjusted disease prevalence factor for domain k for practice 
g 
Rgki = Sgki vgk revenue from indicator i in domain k.  
 
 
 
Practice g revenue from indicator i in disease domain k is  
1 12 2
1
1/ ( ) / ( / )hgki g ki gki gk g hk hR v M M P M G P MS D
ª ºª º ª º ¦¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼   
               ( ) ( )g ki gki gk gkv F PS D                      (1) 
where ( ) min{1,max{( ) /( ),0}}ogki ki gki ki gki kiL kiU kiLS S D S D D D D    and Dgki = Ngki/(Pgk  Egki). 
For Dgki  (DkiL, DkiU) , /gki gkR Pw w  has the same sign as 
        
1 1
2 2
1
( / )( )
gki
gk hk hh
gk gki
P P M
P E
D ª º ¬ ¼ ¦  
     
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 21 1( ) ( / ) ( / )
2 2gki kiL gk hk h gk hk h gk gh h
P P M P P M P MD D    ­ ½ª º ª º  ® ¾¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¯ ¿¦ ¦   
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P P M
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D ª º  ¬ ¼ ¦ 1 12 2
11( ) ( / )
2gki kiL gk hk hh
P P MD D  ª º  ¬ ¼¦  
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gki kiL gk hk hh
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P P M
P E P
D D D ª º ª º   « » ¬ ¼« »¬ ¼ ¦  < 0                            (2) 
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C. Comparative statics 
 
The practice objective function is  
      ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )s N E P bN R N E P C N E P    
               ( ) ( )bN v F PS D      1 1 1/ /o o oN E Pc N c E E P c P P M      
            221 2 22 ( ) /o oN Ec N c E E Pª  «¬  22 ( ) /oPc P P M º  »¼                              (1) 
R is twice differentiable except at DL where the derivative of points S(D) with respect to achievement Sc  
jumps from zero to positive and at DU where it jumps down to zero.  C is also twice differentiable 
except at Eo (and Po) where the derivative with respect to E (and P) jumps from negative to positive.  
 
Proposition 1. For any given vector of cost parameters, true prevalence, true exceptions and list size, 
there exist b1, b2, b3, b4 (with b1 < b2 < b3 < b4) such that for all b < b1 the practice optimum has D < DL 
, for 2 3( , )b b b  the optimum has ( , )L UD D D  and for b > b4 the optimum has D  > DU.   
 
Solutions with D < DL 
 
The first order conditions are  
 0, 0, 0N N Ns b C N s N  d t                                                          (2) 
 0E E E Es C s C
     ! !                                                (3) 
 0P P Ps C C
    ! !                                           (4) 
where superscripts +,   indicate left and right sided derivatives with respect to E evaluated at E*L = Eo 
and similarly for P at P*L = Po.  The solution has E*L = Eo, P*L = Po since gaming generates no 
additional revenue when D < DU.  Since sN(0,Eo,Po) = b – CN(0,Eo,Po) = b – cP1 and cP1 is finite there 
always exists a sufficiently high b (b1) (or small cP1) such that N*L(b) > 0 for b > b1. It is also obvious 
that N*L(b) (and hence D*L = N*L/(P*L – E*L)) is increasing in b.  
 
Solutions with D  (DL, DU)   
 
Consider first solutions with D  (DL, DU) and where the cost parameters cE1 and cP1 are small enough 
that the optimal E*UL z Eo and P*UL z Po. The first order conditions are 
 0
NN N N N
s b R C b v F CS Dc                                      (5)   
 0E E E E Es R C v F CS Dc                                     (6)   
 ( ) 0P P P P Ps R C v F v F CS D S Dc c                                     (7)   
Recall that when D  (DL, DU),  RE > 0 and RP < 0,  so that the solution has CE > 0 and CP < 0 which 
requires E*UL > Eo and P*UL < Po.   
 
The second order partials of s(N,E,P) are 
 NN NNs C   < 0                                   (8) 
 EE EE EEs v F CS Dc   < 0                                  (9) 
 2PP PP P PPs v F v F v F CS D S D Sc c c cc     < 0                                          (10) 
 0NE NEs v FS Dc !                                                    (11) 
 NP NP Ns v F v FS D S Dc c c     
           
1 ( )o o oL L
P
U L U L U L
N v F v F v FS S D D S DDD D D D D D
 ª º c c  « »  ¬ ¼
 
        
1
o
L
P
U L
N R v FS DD D
 ª ºc « »¬ ¼
 < 0                                           (12) 
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 2EP EP E NP Ns v F v F v F v FS D S D S D D S D Dc c c c c c     
       > @2NP NPs v FD S D Dc   < 0                               (13) 
The sign of sNN follows from the convexity of the cost function.  Since DEE = DPP > 0, the signs of sEE 
and sPP require the stronger restrictions that marginal costs of E and P are increasing faster than the 
marginal revenue from E and P.  sNE > 0 follows from DNE > 0.  sNP < 0 since adding the term 
1( )o L U Lv FS D D D  c to Rp changes the square bracketed term in (2) to ( ) 2
gki gki
gk gki gkP E P
D D  < 0.  
Finally sEP < 0 because sNP < 0 and DNP < 0.  
 
The signs of the cross partials are not sufficient to ensure that s(N,E,P) is strictly concave but they do 
ensure some definite comparative static results.  Since sNb = 1, sEb = 0, sPb = 0 we have  
 
*
2 1( ) 0
UL
EE PP PE
N
s s s
b
w ª º   ' !¬ ¼w                                (14) 
 > @* 1 0UL EN PP PN EPE s s s sb 
w   ' !w                                (15) 
 > @* 1 0UL EN PE PN EEP s s s sb 
w    ' w                                (16) 
where the Hessian ' < 0 since s(N,E,P) is locally concave in the neighbourhood of the solution.  Local 
concavity also implies that the principal minor sEEsPP  (sPE)
2
 > 0, hence establishing the sign of (14).  
The signs (15) and (16) follow from ' < 0 and the signs of the cross partials previously established. 
Since wN*UL/wb >  0 and 
* *
0
UL ULP E
b b
w w w w  we also have wD
*UL
/wb > 0.  
 
Given the separability of cost function in N, E, and P similar arguments establish that an increase in 
cN1 or cN2 reduces N*UL and E*UL, increases P*UL, and hence reduces D*UL. 
 
Now consider solutions with D  (DL, DU) and the cost parameter cE1 large enough that the optimal 
E*UL = Eo  so that the first order conditions are 
 0
NN N N N
s b R C b v F CS Dc                                                (17) 
 0E E E E E Es R C s R C
     ! !                                 (18) 
 ( ) 0P P P P Ps R C v F v F CS D S Dc c                                   (19) 
where ,E Es s
 
 are the left and right sided derivatives of s with respect to E evaluated at Eo.  Then we 
can use the local concavity of s in N and P and the signs of sNN and sNP to establish that wN*UL/wb >  0, 
wP*UL/wb < 0 and wD*UL/wb > 0.  If the first order condition (18) on E is replaced by  
 0E E E E E Es R C s R C
     !                                  (20) 
Then an increase in b will also increase E*UL from Eo.  (Suppose not. But then the increase in D*UL via 
the increase in N*UL and the reduction in P*UL will increase RE = 1 2( ) ( )o oU Lv N P ES D D     and 
0Es
 ! .) 
 
Similar arguments apply to cases where D  (DL, DU) with P*UL = Po and where D  (DL, DU) with E*UL = 
Eo, P*UL = Po.  Thus for all solutions with D  (DL, DU) we have established that wN*UL/wb >  0, wE*UL/wb 
t 0, wP*UL/wb d 0 and wD*UL/wb > 0, with strict inequalities holding for low enough marginal costs of 
gaming. 
 
Existence of solutions with D  (DL, DU) 
 
The first order condition (2) for solutions with D < DL implies that N*L(b) = (b – cN1)/cN2 for b t b1 = cP1. 
Now consider bc  defined by N*L(bc) = DL(Po  Eo).  We have 
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10 ( )o oN N N Ns b C s v P E b CS  c c c                                     (21) 
Hence there must exist a b2 < bc such that 
   1* * * *2 2 2 2 2 2( ( )) 0 ( ) ( ) ( ( ))L LUN Nb C N b b v P b E b C N bS c                                 (22) 
and the practice is indifferent between the two solutions at b2.  For b > b2 it strictly prefers solutions 
with D  > DL.  
 
Solutions with D  (DU, 1) 
 
Solutions above the upper threshold with D  (DU, 1) satisfy 
 0N Ns b C                                        (23)   
 0E E Es C C
    ! !                                       (24)   
 0oP P P Ps R C v F CS c                                      (25) 
and E*U = Eo, P*U > Po.  Since N does not affect sP increases in b or reductions in the marginal cost of 
N have no effect on P* and E* but do increase N*U and D*U.  With sufficiently high b or low marginal 
cost parameters on N the solution N*U = P*U  Eo, D*U = 1 is obtained. 
 
Solutions with D = DU 
 
The first order condition (5) on N for solutions with D  (DL, DU) solves for  
      
  1* * 1* 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
o UL UL
U L PUL N P
P P
P b E b b cR b cN b
c c
S D D ª º     ¬ ¼                               (26) 
We know that P*UL(b) is decreasing and E*UL(b) increasing in b. Hence N*UL(b) increases at least 
linearly with b and so must D*UL(b).  Hence there exists b3 > b2 such that 
3
*lim ( )UL
b b
bDo  = DU  where 
limit is from below. The same conclusion holds if E*UL(b) = Eo or P*UL(b) = Po. 
 
The first order condition on N for solutions with D  (DU, 1) solves for  
 
* 1
2
( )L P
P
b cN b
c
                                  (27) 
which is increasing linearly with b. So is D*U(b) since E*U and P*U do not vary with b.  Thus there exists 
a b4 such that  
4
*lim ( )U
b b
bDo  = DU where the limit is from above.  Since P*UL(b) d Po d P*U(b) and 
E*UL(b) t Eo = E*U comparison of (26)  and (27) shows that b4 > b3. 
 
For solutions b  (b3, b4) where D = DU, we substitute for N = DU(P – E) in s(N,E,P) and obtain the first 
order conditions 
 ( ) 0E U NC b CD     
 ( ) 0P P U NR C b CD     
when 
* ( )UE b  >  Eo and * ( )UP b  < Po. Differentiation respect to b shows that * ( ) /UE b bw w < 0, 
* ( ) /UP b bw w  > 0 and * ( ) /UN b bw w  > 0.  If solutions with D = DU have * ( )UE b > Eo and * ( )UP b  = Po, 
then 
* ( ) /UE b bw w < 0 and * ( ) /UN b bw w > 0.  Conversely if * ( )UE b =  Eo and * ( )UP b  < Po, then 
* ( ) /UP b bw w > 0 and * ( ) /UN b bw w  > 0.  Finally if  * ( )UE b =  Eo and * ( )UP b = Po, then 
* ( ) /UN b bw w = 0. 
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We summarise the comparative static properties of the model within solution types in the table. 
 
Comparative statics 
  Effect on 
Increase in Solution type N
 
E P D 
Altruism b (or reduction in 
marginal cost of N) 
( , )L UD D D  + +  + 
UD D!  + 0 0 + 
List size M; maximum 
points
oS  
( , )L UD D D  + +  + 
UD D!  0 0 +  
True exceptions Eo 
( , )L UD D D  + +  + 
UD D!  0 0 0 0 
True prevalence Po 
( , )L UD D D    +  
UD D!  0 0 +  
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Appendix D.  Reported achievement and delivered quality  
 
Determinants of reported achievement and delivered quality reported in Scottish practices 
2005/6 
 Reported achievement Delivered quality 
 Coef t Coef t 
Prop d15  5.817 2.04 4.946 1.64 
Prop >75 -9.406 -2.49 -0.935 -0.24 
SMR 0.000 0.01 -0.001 -0.14 
Income depriv -0.090 -7.49 -0.117 -9.07 
Ethnicity -5.646 -1.07 -17.184 -2.98 
Rural 0.104 0.41 0.850 3.20 
Sparsity 0.010 0.72 0.032 2.10 
List 1000 -0.137 -5.43 -0.112 -4.56 
GP/list 1000 0.601 2.71 0.270 1.17 
Prop female GP 0.396 1.21 0.527 1.57 
Av GP age -0.025 -1.54 -0.043 -2.65 
Prop GP not UK qual -1.252 -2.45 -1.004 -2.03 
PMS contract -0.445 -1.61 -0.881 -3.34 
Dispensing -0.404 -1.23 -0.165 -0.49 
Training -0.425 -2.70 -0.225 -1.35 
Ex FH 0.711 5.17 0.161 1.14 
New practice 0.206 0.70 -0.025 -0.09 
Herfindahl -1.615 -4.34 -2.045 -5.06 
SPICE 0.872 6.33 0.507 3.56 
Patient Inflow -3.295 -1.62 -3.384 -1.88 
Software: Egton -0.354 -1.29 0.087 0.31 
Software: In Practice 0.677 2.61 1.191 4.00 
Software: Protechnic 1.102 2.22 1.068 1.56 
Software: iSoft 0.121 0.32 0.542 1.30 
Constant 92.874 66.46 88.908 62.36 
     
2R   0.6227  0.7548 
N  58453  56980 
Achievement: 100*N/D.  Delivered quality: 100*N/(D+E), where N is number of patients for whom indicator was achieved, D is 
the number declared suitable by the practice, E is the number exception reported.  OLS regressions also include 14 Health 
Board dummies and 64 indicator dummies.  Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering in practices.   *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05. 
The standardised illness ratio (SIR), income deprivation and employment deprivation are highly correlated. We used income 
deprivation, and dropped SIR and other deprivation measures in the reported achievement and delivered quality models 
because of the considerable interest in income related inequity in health care delivery.   
 
 
